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[*1]
Matter of Reyes v Stanford
2015 NY Slip Op 51843(U) [50 Misc 3d 1201(A)]
Decided on December 11, 2015
Supreme Court, Franklin County
Feldstein, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Decided on December 11, 2015 
Supreme Court, Franklin County
 
In the Matter of the Application of Joel Reyes, No. 88-A-2651, Petitioner, for Judgment Pursuant to
Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules 
against




S. Peter Feldstein, J.
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was originated by the Petition of Joel Reyes, verified on
June 24, 2015 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk's Office on August 11, 2015. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Franklin
Correctional Facility, is challenging the June 2014 determination denying him discretionary parole release. The Court issued an Order
to Show Cause on August 17, 2015 and has received and reviewed respondent's Answer and Return, including in camera materials,
verified on October 2, 2015 and supported by the Letter Memorandum of Christopher J. Fleury, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated
October 2, 2015. The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner's Reply and Return/Memorandum of Law, both dated October 20,
2015 and both filed in the Franklin County Clerk's office on October 27, 2015.
On February 24, 1988 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of
18 years to life upon his convictions of the crimes of Murder 2°, Manslaughter 2° and Attempted Robbery 2°. The convictions were
affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department. People v. Reyes, 162 AD2d 420, lv denied 76 NY2d 896. After
having been denied discretionary parole release on multiple (five ?) occasions, petitioner reappeared before a Parole Board on June 3,
2014. Following that appearance petitioner was again denied discretionary parole release and it was directed that he be held for an
additional 24 months. The June 2014 parole denial determination reads as follows:
"PAROLE IS DENIED. AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL HAS DETERMINED
THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE
AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY [without] AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE
INCOMPATIBLE [with] THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW. THIS DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
FACTORS: I.O.'S ARE MURDER 2ND, MANSLAUGHTER 2ND, AND ATT. ROBBERY 2ND WHEREIN [*2]WHEN
ACTING IN-CONCERT YOU ATTEMPTED TO ROB YOUR VICTIM. YOU THEN ENGAGED IN BEATING THE
VICTIM WHICH CAUSED HIM TO FALL ONTO THE SUBWAY TRACKS AS A TRAIN APPROACHED KILLING
HIM INSTANTLY. YOU WERE ON PROBATION AT THE TIME OF THE I.O. YOUR RECORD DATES BACK TO
1984 AND INCLUDES FELONIES, MISDEMEANORS, PRIOR VIOLENCE, PRIOR . . . JAIL AND FAILURE AT
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION. YOU CLEARLY FAILED TO BENEFIT FROM PRIOR EFFORTS AT
REHABILITATION. NOTE IS MADE BY THIS BOARD OF YOUR SENTENCING MINUTES, COMPAS RISK
ASSESSMENT, REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS, RISKS, NEEDS[,] PAROLE PLAN[,] DISCIPLINARY RECORD, AN[D]
ALL OTHER REQUIRED FACTORS."
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The document perfecting petitioner's administrative appeal from the June 2014 parole denial determination was received by the
DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on November 24, 2014. Although the Appeals Unit failed to issue its findings and
recommendation within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a belated decision on administrative appeal was,
in fact, issued on or about July 10, 2015. This proceeding was commenced on August 15, 2015 when the Petition was filed in the
Franklin County Clerk's Office. See CPLR §304(a).
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A, §§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011,
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law. In making the parole release decision, the
procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the
following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements,
vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate . . . (vii)
the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record,
including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional
confinement . . ."
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial [*3]functions which are not reviewable if done in
accordance with law (Executive Law §259-i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon v.
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v.
Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the petitioner makes a "convincing demonstration to the contrary" the Court must presume that the New
York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v.
New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
The primary argument advanced in the Petition that the Parole Board focused excessively/exclusively on the serious nature of the
crimes underlying petitioner's incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record, without adequate consideration of other statutory
factors. In this regard petitioner alleges that he has completed numerous educational, vocational and therapeutic programs as well as
various non-mandatory programs. Petitioner also alleges that he possesses the skills and work ethic to succeed in the job market upon
release and that he has developed solid, alternative, release plans. Nevertheless, according to petitioner, "[t]he Board of Parole clearly
did not take any of these efforts into consideration."
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in
connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.
See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, app dismissed 24 NY3d 1052, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and
Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court
reviewing a parole denial determination ". . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only
whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in
the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board's weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it
considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior." Comfort v. New York State
Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report (Reappearance June 2014) and transcript of petitioner's June 3, 2014 Parole
Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including petitioner's
therapeutic/vocational programing records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record
(clean since his last Parole Board appearance) and release plans/community support in addition to the circumstances of the crimes
underlying his incarceration (including the fact that such crimes were committed while petitioner was on probation from a previous YO
Robbery adjudication) and prior criminal record. The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole
Board cut short petitioner's discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses
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to its inquiries. Indeed, before the June 3, 2014 Parole Board interview was concluded one of the presiding commissioners inquired of
petitioner as follows: "Mr. Reyes, the last word is yours, anything that you would like to let us know tonight?" Petitioner responded as
follows: "Like I said in my statement, I am sorry for everything that happened, occurred in my life, and I took this time over this
[*4]incarceration to reflect on what I did, it was wrong and I just want to start a brand new life. I am getting old and I would like to pay
a visit to my mother's grave, she passed away last year, give my respect, you know, have an opportunity to assist my sister and my
father."
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.
See Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory factors
were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result of the emphasis
placed by the Board on the serious/violent nature of the crimes underlying petitioner's incarceration, including the fact that such crimes
were committed while petitioner was on probation from a previous YO Robbery adjudication, as well as his prior criminal record. See
Thompson v. New York State Board of Parole, 120 AD3d 1518, Shark v. New York State Division of Parole Chair, 110 AD3d 1134, lv
dismissed 23 NY3d 933 and Dalton v. Evans, 84 AD3d 1664.
To the extent petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff'd 83 NY2d 788, the
Court finds such reliance misplaced. In King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole Board
improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect to convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board
failed " . . . to consider and fairly weigh all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under the
statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements and would appear to strongly militate in favor of
granting parole." Id at 433. The appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced by the Board in
the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime underlying Mr. King's incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty
police officer during the robbery of a fast food restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First Department, "[s]ince . . . the
Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating
circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself." Id at 433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Franklin County) first notes that although the nature of the crime underlying Mr. King's incarceration
was somewhat similar in nature to one of the crimes underlying petitioner's incarceration (Murder 2°), Mr. King had no prior contacts
with the law (id. at 426) while petitioner has a substantial prior criminal record and committed the instant offenses while on probation.
These distinguishing features appear to meet the First Department's requirement that a parole denial determination be supported by
aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the underlying crime. In any event, in July of 2014 the Appellate
Division, Third Department - whose precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the above-referenced "aggravating
circumstances" requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not represent the state of the law in the Third Department.
See Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted that the Third Department " . . . has
repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the [Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute
[Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] it is entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime' (Matter of Montane v.
Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014) [internal quotation marks and [*5]citations omitted]' . . ." Id at 1271
(other citations omitted). After favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the Hamilton court
ended the string of cites as follows: " . . . but see Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff'd on
other grounds 83 NY2d 788[[FN1] ] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the Board [of Parole]
may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to
be dismissed as not outweighing the seriousness of the crime]." 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The Hamilton court continued as follows:
"Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner's institutional behavior and accomplishments are
exemplary,' the Board may place particular emphasis' on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in denying parole, as long
as the relevant statutory factors are considered (Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we explained
that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner's admirable educational and vocational accomplishments and positive prison
disciplinary history, [o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in accordance with the requirements of
the statutory guidelines is not subject to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety'
(id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department]
has repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing denials of parole to petitioners whom we
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recognized as having exemplary records and as being compelling candidates for release." 119 AD3d 1268, 1272 (additional
citations omitted).
The Court therefore rejects petitioner's argument on this point.
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the
New York State Board of Parole shall ". . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such
written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the
likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining which [*6]inmates
may be released to parole supervision . . ."[FN2] To the extent petitioner argues that the Parole Board failed to adopt rules or regulations
implementing the above-referenced amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), the Court finds that the promulgation of the October 5,
2011 memorandum from Andrea W. Evans, then Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, satisfied the Parole Board's obligations
with respect to the 2011 amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4). See Partee v. Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 2014 NY Slip Op
82439, and Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: December 11, 2015 at
 Indian Lake, New York.
 __________________________
 S. Peter Feldstein
 Acting Supreme Court Justice
Footnotes
Footnote 1:The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that " . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners considered factors
outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the
death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of
such factors is not authorized by Executive Law §259-i." 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that
aspect of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination must be based upon a
showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the underlying crime. 
 
Footnote 2:Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall ". . . establish written
guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written guidelines may consider the use of a risk and
needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision . . ." 
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